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INFORMATION WARFARE:
FUTURE CHALLENGES OF LATVIA AND UKRAINE
The article covers a social and philosophical analysis of essential attributes and multiple
manifestations of the information hybrid warfare in Latvia and Ukraine. The combination of forms,
methods, means and tools in preparation for and committing hybrid aggression varies depending
on the conditions of its implementation, response of international community and regional specifics.
Further, there is a certain general algorithm for launching hybrid warfare. Usually it comprises
a number of stages and the role of mass media at each is different.
The initial hybrid influence of Russian media in Ukraine can be traced back to the period
following the victory of the Maidan in 2014. At the first stage the hidden information aggression of
Russia against Ukraine manifested itself in absolutization of language and confession issues,
speculation on economic difficulties, emphasizing the incompatibility of values of the West and
East of Ukraine, which are focused on Europe and Russia, respectively. The second stage unfolded
concurrently with the Revolution of Dignity. Media purposefully presented a unilaterally distorted
"picture" of social disorder and collapse of the government machinery at the time and aggravated
the pre-developed stereotypes and myths in respect of the fundamental incapability of the Ukrainians
to have their state. The third stage fell at a "hot phase" of the armed conflict. It featured a great
number of fake news and information as well as blatant lie of Russian media.
As to the information aggression of Russia against Latvia, it should be primarily taken into
account here that the latter is a member of the NATO and European Union, which Moscow is
unwilling to enter into an open conflict with, therefore using an arsenal of non-military tools of
hybrid warfare against EU countries.
Key words: hybrid warfare; hybrid aggression; informational influence; conflict; mass media; Ukraine;
Latvia.
Formulation of the problem. The Russian Federation
claims to unconditional domination in the former Soviet
Union escalated into the undeclared hybrid war, which
involves combination of both military and unmilitary tactics
and techniques. Neo-imperialist ambitions of Moscow
become real threat to peace in Europe. In Ukraine, such
policy has already led to a hot stage of the conflict, which
resulted in the military operation in Donbas. In Latvia, which
is a member of the European Union, it is limited to the
information war. However, in cases, a hybrid aggressor
relies on citizens of those countries it enters into a confron-
tation with. Moscow considers a part of them as its active
allies, a kind of the "fifth column", another part - as the
local opposition undermining stability of the national poli-
tical system, and the rest - as "fellow men" filled with
nostalgia for Soviet order.
It is likely that there are certain common factors of hybrid
aggression and this research is intended to determine
them. Under conditions of information war, there is much
tension around the issue of a national security system,
which involves protection of country's humanitarian space.
Research analysis and research publications on this
issue. The essence, content and general trends of hybrid
warfare are covered in works by Volodymyr Horbulin [2017],
Oleg Bazaluk [2017] and Yevgen Magda [2015].
The most recent methods of informational influence in
the context of hybrid warfare were examined by such
authors as Stephen Blank [2014], Phillip A. Karber [2015],
Volodymyr Mandragelya [2003], Volodymyr Biletskyi,
Grygorii Kovalskyi and Oleksandr Shtokvysh.
Specific aspects of manifestation of the information
confrontation in Ukraine were studied by Artis Pabryk, Andis
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Kudorsa, Roman Dodonov [2016], Vira Dodonova [2016],
Serhy Yekelchyk [2015], Olga Lazorenko [2015], Tetiana
Chernenko [2015] and Andrew Wilson [2015].
Peculiarities of the information aggression of Russia
against the Baltic States in general and Latvia in particular
were looked into by Ainars Dymants, Vilson Maili, Ieva
Berzina, Janis Berzins, Martiņ s Hirss, Toms Rostoks, Nora
Vanaga [2016], Vadim Poleshchuk [2013], Diāna Potjom-
kina [2014; 2015], Valery Stepanov and Elizabete Vizgunova
[2014].
However, beyond the limits of scientific discourse is
still the comparison of methods and forms of informational
influence of Russia in the countries which have already
faced armed conflicts, on the one hand, and where the
hybrid confrontation was not accompanied with military
actions, on the other hand.
The purpose of this article is to analyze essential
features and a variety of hybrid warfare manifestations in
Latvia and Ukraine.
Presenting the main material. The state and society
have always used false information to confuse enemies.
Manifestation of present-day Russian propaganda has a
qualitative difference even in comparison with the former
decade as deception is a pivot of the current Russian
military strategy. It clearly reflects the logic of the deception
process - intentional paltering with facts, creation of mess
in society, promotion of insecurity and distorted perception
of general events, problems and processes. There is no
interpretation of various or different facts. There are only
lie and truth. It obstructs public space, creating chaos in
interpretation of specific facts, events and processes. Pro-
paganda always aims spreading of needed fallacies with
a view to stand against audience, cultivating of terror and
winning support of faithful persons. Professor S. Veinberga
recognizes that: "In case of Ukraine it is very clear: from the
very first day of the Maidan the Russians from the Kremlin
say that these events are abetted from Washington and
Brussels. The Kremlin-led TV shows make active use of
"eyewitnesses" who even didn't take part in this event, …
but make comments on very emotional episodes and thus
produce needed emotions without any arguments" [Vein-
berga, 2016].
However, there is still an unanswered question - why
are some citizens sensitive to manipulative influence and
others are able to make a stand? Which factors, psycho-
logical, sociocultural, ideological etc., contribute to the
sustainability of an individual? A recipe of countermeasures
to external manipulation, and thus sustainability of national
policy space, depends on answers to these questions.
Researchers of hybrid warfare [Гібридна війна, 2017:
84-86] state that the combination of forms, methods,
means and tools in preparation for and commitment of
hybrid aggression varies depending on its implementation
conditions, response of international community, regional
specifics etc. Saying that, there are several fundamental
principles of aggression, specifically:
- uniqueness and dependence of hybrid forces, their
structure and potential on the specific conflict context, which
is called forth by time, geographic, sociocultural and
historical factors;
- availability of specific ideology within hybrid forces
which form the internal basis of the organization. This
ideology is inextricably intertwined with the strategic context
and based on sociocultural or religious identity. In case of
the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, it was the ideas
of "Russian World" and Orthodoxy;
- availability of an existential threat of a potential enemy.
Its apprehension makes hybrid forces refuse conventional
military thinking and a course of action for the purpose of
long-term survival. Any attempt of the Ukrainian state to
step up military pressure on separatists results in esca-
lation of the military confrontation, which forces it to return
to status quo as happened near Avdiivka in January 2017;
- flexible balance between regular and irregular forces.
As a rule, the first component is much smaller than the
second;
- dynamic combination of military and non-military
technologies, wide use of hidden methods of fight. They
may also include terroristic and criminal practices;
- reliance on a defensive type of operations in the first
place, which does not exclude individual offensive actions;
- continuous use of tactics of harassing and draining
the enemy's strength, both physical as well as moral and
psychological.
Further, there is a certain algorithm for waging a hybrid
war. As a rule, it includes a number of phases:
- Non-military asymmetric actions (collection of infor-
mation, coordinated moral and psychological, ideological,
diplomatic and economic actions within the framework of
a plan for developing a favorable political, economic and
military context).
- Special operations for deluding political and military
heads of a state owing to coordinated measures involving
diplomatic channels, media, government and military
institutions as well as through feeding distorted or false
information, orders, directives, instructions etc.
- Intimidation, delusion and bribery of public and military
officials, aimed at their treachery of the own people and
negligent performance of their official duties.
- Use of destabilizing propaganda for provoking
displeasure of population, build-up of sabotage.
- Establishment of an air-exclusion zone throughout a
country, set up of blockades and wide use of private military
companies in close collaboration with armed opposition
units.
- Beginning of active actions which are directly preceded
by large-scale reconnaissance and sabotage operations.
The entire possible range of types, forms, methods and
forces is then used, including special operations forces,
radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic and secret
intelligence services as well as industrial espionage.
- Combination of targeted informational and electronic
operations, aerospace activities and continuous pressure
of air forces coupled with the use of precision weapons
launched from various platforms (long-range artillery and
arms based on new physical principles, including non-
lethal biological weapon).
- Continued suppression of resistance points and exter-
mination of enemy units in the course of special operations,
expansion of clean-up territories until the final break down
of the enemy's resistance.
According to P. Karber [2015], the Russian model of
hybrid warfare has three stages, the first one implying the
country destabilization through boosting the internal
instability and conflict, the second one aimed at destroying
the respective state at the expense of catastrophic ruining
of its economy and infrastructure, the third one targeted at
replacement of local authorities with supporters of Russia
and "invitation of rescuers". Accordingly, the role of mass
media at each of the stages is different.
The initial hybrid influence of Russian media in Ukraine
can be traced back to the period following the victory of
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Maidan in 2014. It is from that particular period that a so-
called index of aggressiveness (an indicator showing a
ratio of negative materials about Ukraine to the number of
neutral publications) has been gradually growing. A report
of Valerii Gerasimov, Chief of General Staff of the RF Armed
Forces, which was published in Russian newspaper
"Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kur'yer", indicates that the above
was no coincidence. The General emphasizes: "Informa-
tional confrontation opens up manifold asymmetric pos-
sibilities for reducing the enemy's combat potential. In
North Africa we witnessed the implementation of tech-
nologies for influencing government institutions and
population through information networks. It is essential to
improve our actions in information space, including those
for protection of our own facilities" [Герасимов, 2013]. He
continues that in modern warfare the proportion of non-
military and military actions is 4 to 1, and through
informational influence even an "entirely well-off state may
in a matter of months or even days turn into an arena for
severe armed struggle, become a victim to foreign inter-
vention, fall into a vortex of chaos, humanitarian disaster
and civil war" [Герасимов, 2013].
At the first stage the hidden informational aggression
of Russia against Ukraine manifested itself in abso-
lutization of language and confession issues, speculation
on economic difficulties, emphasizing the incompatibility
of values of the West and East of Ukraine, which are
focused on Europe and Russia, respectively. Today it is
already known that to agitate against Ukraine in social
networks there was a so called Center 18 set up within the
structure of the Federal Security Service of Russia in 2006,
"thought leaders" bribed, who had an influence on de-
cisions of the expert environment, parliamentarians,
politicians, ministers even the president. Any negative
phenomena of Ukrainian life were presented as logical
consequences of criminal actions of the authorities which,
unlike the Russian ones, care about their own interests
rather than those of the people. Concurrently, the RF
geopolitical project in the form of a Russian World concept
was promoted. Such presentation of information fostered
spreading of schizogenetic and later openly separatist
moods in Ukraine, especially in the Crimea and Donbas
which are densely populated by many ethnic Russians.
The late summer of 2013, when Russian central TV
channels joined the campaign, is considered the transition
from hidden influence to a direct information attack of
Russian media at Ukraine (let us recall Dmytro Kyseliov's
program with his known "motors are dying, not everyone
will survive", as of September 24, 2013).
The second stage unfolded concurrently with the
events at the Euromaidan, also known as the Revolution
of Dignity. It is difficult to definitely assert whether the turmoil
was entirely inspired by Russian intelligence services or
the latter only took advantage of the situation but the state
of "controlled chaos" which resulted in a paralysis of the
military and political leadership and its inability to defend
the country from the external aggression absolutely served
the interests of the assaulter. Media purposefully presented
a unilaterally distorted "picture" of social disorder and
collapse of the government machinery at the time and
aggravated the pre-developed stereotypes and myths in
respect of the fundamental incapability of the Ukrainians
to have their state. Russian media tended to call the post-
Maidan Ukrainian authorities "junta", "fascists", "bande-
rovtsi" and mutual affronts of TV show participants became
standard communication practice.
The third stage fell at a 'hot phase' of the armed conflict.
It featured a great number of fake news and information
as well as blatant lie of Russian media. It suffices to recall
the denial of the presence of the Russian military in
Donbas, non-recognition of shooting down the Malaysia
Airlines Boeing Flight MH-17, classification of the number
of Russian military casualties in time of peace etc. Russian
media have however performed their function of engen-
dering mass discontent in the enemy camp, contributed
to mobilization and consolidation of anti-Ukrainian forces,
gave rise to an illusion of implementation of the "Crimean
scenario" in Donbas and eventually ensured holding of a
referendum dedicated to establishment of self-appointed
republics in the East of Ukraine, oriented to join the RF.
Only the resistance by the Armed Forces of Ukraine,
volunteer units, support of the civil society, particularly
volunteers, and a strong stand of global community
prevented the Russian General Staff from implementation
of its plans to the finish.
Today, in four years after the beginning of the military
activities, the tone of Russian publications and broadcasts
about Ukraine is noticeably more restrained and moderate.
The peak of tension and aggressiveness is past as it is
impossible to incessantly support artificial hysteria. On
the other part, the index of aggressiveness of Ukrainian
media has also dropped. According to Russian media-
metrie data, it came to 3.85 in May of 2017 [Николайчук,
2017]. For reference, almost a similar indicator (3.4) was
then reported in Lithuania which faced no armed conflict
with Russia and had no numerous casualties, damage
and hundreds of thousands of migrants from the occupied
territories.
As to the informational aggression of Russia against
Latvia, it should be primarily taken into account here that
the latter is a member of the NATO and European Union
which Moscow is unwilling to come into an open conflict
with. According to Stefan Blank, Russia uses a somewhat
different arsenal of non-military tools of hybrid warfare
against EU countries, specifically:
- investment in key sectors of economies of European
states;
- use of Russian investment, trade and capital for bribes
and stepping up an influence on economy and political
elite of western countries;
- bribery of representatives of western media and
support to anti-integration and pro-Russian political parties;
- sales of arms and military equipment to influence
military decision taking by foreign countries;
- large-scale infiltration of the intelligence service into
European organizations;
- establishing links between Russian organized crime
and local criminal elements;
- establishing contacts with religious institutions which
use unresolved ethnic conflicts and consider campaigns
against the "rights of minorities";
- significant support of Russian information overseas;
- massive coordination of cyberattacks on selected
targets [Blank, 2014].
Researchers emphasize the fact of hybrid technologies
existence in Latvia. As in Ukraine before 2014, there was
strong informational influence directed at creation of the
"fifth column" from the Russian-speaking population there.
As indicated by Ainars Dimants, Professor of the Riga
University, after the outbreak of the conflict in the East of
Ukraine the Russian-speaking population of Latvia got
polarized: 36% of the people support the policy of
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Volodymyr Putin, aimed at expansion of the "Russian
World", 20-30 % focus on Latvia affiliated to the European
Union and the others have not yet decided [Балтия и
информационная война…, 2015]. Typically, Russian
media present the situation as follows: the hybrid attack is
delivered by Latvia against Russia rather than vice versa.
Thus, having analyzed the dynamics of the index of Latvian
media aggressiveness, which values grew from 0.4 in 2013,
1.0 in 2014 and 4.2 in 2015 to 5.0 in 2016, Igor Nikolay-
chuk draws an absurd conclusion that the above is a
consequence of an "order from Washington" and is in no
way related to neo-imperialist ambitions of the Kremlin
[Николайчук, 2017].
At the initial stage of aggression attention is focused
on a biased content and interpretation of information, use
of a historical memory content, reaching out to values of
the Soviet period etc. Due to a geographic and sociocultural
specifics of Latgalian region, in particular a significant
number of Russian-speaking people living there, it is a
weak point of Latvian system of humanitarian security. Just
like Donbas in Ukraine, Latgale is very sensitive to
ideologemes of "Russian civilization" and is one of the
most vulnerable regions in Latvia.
The above should be supplemented with the fact that
Latgale [Латгалия, 2017] is the poorest and backward
region of Latvia and its inhabitants are more interested in
survival issues than development of native culture.
In 2012 the Cabinet of Ministers of the Latvian Republic
approved a plan for salvage of Latgale. 98.8 million Euros
were invested in the region, the Latgale Center for
Entrepreneurial Activity set up, 47.48 million Euros
attracted for improvement of the business environment
and 9.07 million Euros allocated for repair of roads. The
Cabinet of Ministers of the Latvian Republic adopted a
plan for development of Latgale in 2015-2017, within
which it was intended to create 818 jobs there and attract
52.18 million Euros from the European Regional Deve-
lopment Fund for renovation of the neglected territories.
The state invests in Latgale also for fear of this territory
potentially becoming an epicenter of instability. More than
a half of its inhabitants are the Russians (including Old
Believers who had settled there as long ago as in the
17th century), the Poles, the Byelorussians, the Ukrainians
and the Lithuanians.
Though the Latgalians inhibiting the eastern part of
Latvia are officially considered the Latvians, they differ from
the latter in both religion and language. If the prevailing
religion in other parts of the country is Lutheranism, the
Latgalians are Catholics.
To date the state legislation of Latvia declares
maintenance, protection and development of the written
Latgalian language as a variant of the Lettish language.
The Latgalian language is taught in the Latvian and
Daugavpils Universities as well as in the Rezekne Higher
School. It is not however learnt in schools, neither is it
used in the state sector.
The Latvian media space is diverse and saturated.
Media content is available mainly in the Latvian and
Russian language, corresponding with the nation's ethnic
composition. Media content in the Russian language is
created by media which is registered in Latvia, as well as
media from Russia which is available in Latvia. The Latvian
media space is characterized by not only the availability of
content in two languages, but also their differences for
Latvian and Russian speaking target audiences. These
differences in content have developed and have existed
since the renewal of Latvia's independence, and this
provides the basis for academics and media experts to
speak about two information spaces as a long-term
problem within Latvian society [Š ulmane, 2006].
Media researcher Signe van Zundert stresses that
the content of Russian media is threatening all three
Baltic States: "Media is not only content - media shapes
reality and fosters a sense of belonging to a community.
If the average media-user in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
does not find a locally produced media outlet that satisfies,
then the likelihood of turning to Russian media is large.
Today, both TV and online audiences are continuously
exposed to biased information from Russia" [Van Zundert,
2016].
The study on Latvian national security also concludes
that the Latvia's media space has to be strengthened: the
Russian media definitely influence Latvia, especially in
relation to the Russian-speaking audience, but the scope
of its influence does not exceed 40% of the population.
The most effective way to reduce the influence of Russian
media is to strengthen the Latvia's media space and look
for ways to keep in touch with all Russian-speaking
residents in Latvia [Bē rziņa, 2016].
Consideration should be also given to the media
market of Latvia. The local media market in Latvia is stable,
especially among the printed communication tools. In each
region of Latvia there are local newspapers issued two or
three times a week with the number of copies 5000-6000.
Among the regions of Latvia, there are differences among
newspaper systems; for example, in the Latgalian region
several newspapers are issued in two languages - Latvian
and Russian, having an identical content. It is defined by
the region's multi-ethnical environment. The local media
market consists mostly of newspapers which encompass
local towns and the nearest rural territories [Murinska,
2013: 52].
Conclusions
Strategic communications gained ground not only due
to spreading Russian fake news within the context of certain
actual events, but also aiming communication on issues
important for the whole world, such as political elections
in the countries which are leaders of the global society,
natural and technogenic disasters etc., in public space.
As Russia had annexed the Crimea and begun supporting
Ukrainian separatists, the concept of "hybrid war" which
describes Russia's strategy in this conflict, materialized
in everyday practice. Latvia, in view of its history and
geopolitical situation, also faces hybrid informational influ-
ence, although it has different performance and variants.
The main task of national media policy both in Ukraine
and Latvia is to achieve sustainability and fidelity of their
own media landscape. Mass media play a fundamental
role in ensuring humanitarian security of Latvia. A strategic
objective of mass media is not only to protect social
environment but also give rise to the development of culture
and spirituality, spreading of democratic values, streng-
thening of the Latvian language, securing stability in socio-
political environment.
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ІНФОРМАЦІЙНА ВІЙНА: МАЙБУТНІ ВИКЛИКИ ЛАТВІЇ ТА УКРАЇНИ
У статті здійснений соціально-філософський аналіз сутнісних ознак і різноманітності проявів інформацій-
ної гібридної війни в Латвії та Україні. Комбінація форм, методів, засобів, інструментів при підготовці та здійсненні
гібридної агресії варіюється в залежності від умов її проведення, реакції міжнародної спільноти, регіональних
особливостей.
Крім цього, існує певний загальний алгоритм розгортання гібридної війни. Зазвичай він включає декілька
стадій, і роль засобів масової інформації на кожній з цих стадій є різною.
В Україні початок гібридного впливу з боку російських ЗМІ може бути зафіксований після перемоги Майда-
ну 2004 року. На першій стадії прихована інформаційна агресія Росії проти України проявлялася в абсолюти-
зації мовної і конфесійної проблем, спекуляції на тему економічних труднощів, підкресленні несумісності цінно-
стей Заходу і Сходу України, орієнтованих, відповідно, на Європу та Росію. Друга стадія розгортається пара-
лельно з Революцією Гідності. На цій стадії ЗМІ цілеспрямовано подають однобічно викривлену "картинку"
суцільного безладу, руйнації державного апарату, поглиблюють сформовані раніше стереотипи і міфи про
принципову неспроможність українців мати свою державу. Третя стадія припадає на "гарячу фазу" збройного
конфлікту. Її характерною рисою є величезна кількість фейкових новин та інформації та відверта брехня
російських ЗМІ.
Щодо інформаційної агресії Росії проти Латвії, то тут слід, насамперед, враховувати, що остання є членом
НАТО і Європейського Союзу, з якими Москва не бажає вступати у відкритий конфлікт, тому проти країн Євро-
союзу Росією використовується арсенал невійськових інструментів гібридної війни.
Ключові слова: гібридна війна; гібридна агресія; інформаційний вплив; конфлікт; ЗМІ; Україна; Латвія.
ЛІТЕРАТУРА
Bazaluk Oleg. The Theory of War and Peace, Geophilosophy of Europe. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
2017. 185 p.
Bē rziņa I. The Possibility of Societal Destabilization in Latvia: Potential National Security Threats. National Defence Academy of
Latvia, 2016. URL: http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/WP%2004-2016-eng.ashx (дата звернення: 12.07.2018).
Blank Stephen. Russia, Hybrid War and the evolution of Europe. Second Line of Defense. 2015-02-14. URL: http://www.sldinfo.com/
russia-hybrid-war-and-the-evolution-of-europe/ (дата звернення: 19.07.2018).
Karber Dr. Phillip A. Russia's Hybrid War Campaign, Implications for Ukraine & Beyond, Washington CSIS 10 March 2015. URL: http:/
/fortunascorner.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/hybridwarfarebrief (дата звернення: 11.07.2018).
Murinska Gaile Sandra. The Role and Functions of Social Media in Modern Society. Is social Media Worthwhile for Local Media?
Journalism research Science journal (Communication and information). 2013. Nr. 6: 43-62. DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/?T/
JR.2013.0.7401.
Potjomkina D. Latvia. EU-28 Watch. 2015. № 11. URL: http://bit.ly/2bQgk3w (дата звернення: 13.08.2018).
Potjomkina D., Vizgunova E. Latvia. EU-28 Watch, 2014. № 10. URL: http://bit.ly/2bPhFKO (дата звернення: 13.08.2018).
Saeima of the Republic of Latvia, 2015. Nacionālās Droš ī bas Koncepcija [National Security Concept], 26 November. URL: http://bit.ly/
2ccFhXW (дата звернення: 11.08.2018).
Sargs.lv. New Law Requires Latvian President to Request Help from NATO in Case of Attack, 2014, 5 June. URL: http://bit.ly/
2bML4nC (дата звернення: 11.08.2018).
SKDS. Latvijas Iedzī votāju Viedoklis par Valsts Aizsardzī bas Jautājumiem. Latvijas Iedzī votāju Aptauja [The Views of the Latvian
Population on National Defence Issues. Survey of the Population of Latvia]. 2015. URL: http://bit.ly/2vhomcs (дата звернення: 03.08.2018).
Statistics Latvia [Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia], 2017. URL: http://www.csb.gov.lv (дата звернення: 12.07.2018).
Šulmane, I., 2006. The Russian Language Media in Latvia. Published: Muiž nieks N. (ed.) Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and
International Dimensions. Rī ga: LU Akademic Publishers, pp.119-130.
Van Zundert, S., 2016. Strengthening pluralistic media and information environment through journalism training, literacy and knowledge-
sharing across Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the EU Eastern Partnership and beyond, in: Resisting Foreign Propaganda in the New
Information Enviroment: The case of the European Union, Russia, and the Countries of the European Union, Foundation for European
Progresive Studies. URL: http://appc.lv/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Propoganda_petijums.pdf (дата звернення: 14.07.2018).
Veinberga S., 2016. Propaganda "salauztajā telefonā" jeb spilvena plivināš ana uz jumta. TVNET. 2016.12.17 URL: https://
www.tvnet.lv/4604734/propaganda-salauztaja-telefona-jeb-spilvena-plivinasana-uz-jumta (дата звернення: 21.07.2018).
Політична філософія
СХІД № 5 (157) вересень-жовтень 2018 р.
72 Філософська антропологія. Філософія культури
Vilson Maili. Baltic Perspectives on the Ukraine Crisis: Europeanization in the Shadow of Insecurity. Ideology and Politics. 2017.
№ 1(7): 8-46. URL: https://ideopol.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/1.3.ENG.%20Baltic%20Perspectives%20Final.pdf (дата звер-
нення: 14.07.2018)
Wilson Andrew. Four Types of Russian Propaganda. Aspen Review. 2015. № 4. URL: http://bit.ly/2uYQIsO (дата звернення:
22.07.2018).
Yekelchyk Serhy. The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. 208 p. URL: http:/
/shron1.chtyvo.org.ua/Yekelchyk_Serhii/THE_CONFLICT_IN_UKRAINE.pdf (дата звернення: 13.08.2018).
Александрова Е.С. Ответственность человека в условиях развития общества / Феномен ответственности в мире
тотальной глобализации: (науч. ред. И.И. Кальной, А.В. Горбань). Симферополь: ИТ "АРИАЛ", 2013. С. 312-325.
Герасимов В. Ценность науки в предвидении. Военно-промышленный курьер. 2013. № 8 (476). URL: https://vpk-news.ru/
articles/14632 (дата звернення: 11.07.2018).
Гібридна війна: in verbo et in praxi. Вінниця: ТОВ "Нілан-ЛТД", 2017. 412 с.
Світова гібридна війна: український фронт: монографія / В. П. Горбулін (ред.). Київ: НІСД, 2017. 496 с.
Додонов Роман. Конфлікт на Сході України у дзеркалі соціально-філософської рефлексії: монографія. Вінниця: Глобус
Пресс, 2016.
Додонова Віра, Додонов Роман. Монологи про Донбас. Вибрані праці з проблематики східноукраїнського конфлікту. Київ,
2018. 336 с.
Додонова Віра. Дискурс кривд та образ: претензії Донбасу до України. Вісник Донецького національного університету.
Серія: філософські науки. 2016. Вип. 1. С. 95-112.
Информационно-психологическая война. Восточный фронт. Аргумент. URL: http://argumentua.com/stati/informatsionno-
psikhologicheskaya-voina-vostochnyi-front (дата звернення: 17.08.2018).
Інформаційні виклики гібридної війни: контент, канали, механізми протидії. Аналітична доповідь. Київ: НІСД, 2016.
Лазоренко Ольга. Інформаційний складник гібридної війни Російської Федерації проти України: тенденції розвитку. Стра-
тегічні пріоритети. 2015. № 3 (36). С. 124-133.
Латгалия. URL: https://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/es/80545/%D0%9B%D0%90%D0%A2%D0%93%D0%90%D0%9B%D0%98-
%D0%AF (дата звернення: 11.07.2018).
Магда Евгений. Гибридная война: выжить и победить. Харьков: Виват, 2015. 320 с.
Мандрагеля Володимир. Причини та характер воєн (збройних конфліктів): філософсько-соціологічний аналіз. Київ: Євро-
пейський університет, 2003. 570 с.
Николайчук Игорь. Латвия - стойкий оловянный солдатик информационной войны. Sputnik Latvija. 02.05.2017. URL: https:/
/lv.sputniknews.ru/columnists/20170502/4629100/latvija-jestonija-indeks-agressivnosti-smi.html (дата звернення: 22.08.2018).
Образ врага в идеологии России. Информационное сопротивление, 08.05.2016. URL: http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/kiev/obraz-
vraga-v-ideologii-rossii-analitika (дата звернення: 21.08.2018).
Этническая политика в странах Балтии / Полещук В.В., Степанов В.В. (отв.ред.). Москва: Наука, 2013. 407 с. URL: http://
static.iea.ras.ru/books/_Ethnic%20Policies%20in%20the%20Baltic%20States%28Nauka%292013%20%281%29.pdf (дата звернен-
ня: 19.08.2018).
Портников В. Балтия и информационная война, Интервью с Айнарсом Димантсом. Радио Свобода. 26.09.2015. URL:
https://www.svoboda.org/a/27266452.html (дата звернення: 12.08.2018).
Стругацький Василь. Агресорний технологічний вплив на масову свідомість на тлі східноукраїнського конфлікту. Підго-
товка ґрунту і перші міфи. Схід. 2016. № 3 (143). С. 101-109. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21847/1728-9343.2016.3(143).74859 (дата
звернення: 17.07.2018).
Черненко Тетяна. Пріоритети державної інформаційної політики в умовах гібридної війни. Стратегічні пріоритети. 2015.
№ 4 (37). URL: http://www.niss.gov.ua/public/File/Str_prioritetu/4_2015_Polityka.pdf (дата звернення: 10.07.2018).
© Murinska Sandra, Aleksandrova Olena, Dodonov Roman
Надійшла до редакції 10.09.2018
Політична філософія
